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Differences in way we pay
• Since 1949, new instruments available
– Credit cards, debit cards and stored-value cards
– Internet banking and Paypal
• How do payment networks develop?
Urban myth busting
• NZ not first to have debit card POS network
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Evidence of differences
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Instrument demand
• Consumers offer, merchants accept
– Reduces costs, makes transaction easier
• Decision complex, differs for each side
– Differentiated products
Attributes: EFTPOS debit v cash
Attribute Merchant Consumer
Speed ↓ ↓
Security ↑ ↑
Convenience − ↑
Transaction fees − ↑
Fixed cost ↑ −
Consumers and network effects
• People shop together, form habits together
• A dynamic learning process
• If already hold instrument, easy to try using
– Cards for ATMs, public transport are helpful
But merchants matter, too!
Instrument supply
• Payment network offering an instrument will:
– Receive fees from users, incur costs
– Want instrument to be useful
• Offers instrument when fees > costs
• Network effects mean participation important
Competition for participants
• Competition means networks make 
instrument attractive
– Provide useful instruments cheaply
New Zealand
• Pre-87, significant restrictions
– Groups dislike each other
• Post-87, anyone can be Registered Bank
– EFTPOS: Handy-point and Cashline
– Inter-bank transfers: Databank, PCL and ISL
• Few other restrictions
Norway and Germany
• Significant controls on banks
– Norwegian Gov’t encourages pricing structure
– Ass’ns of German banks choose structure
• Restrictions on issuers of stored-value
Australia and the UK
• Governments interfere with network rights
• Also make instruments less useful
– Network operations more difficult
– Lesson relevant to NZ
• Restrictions on issuers of stored-value
Canada and the US
• Restrictions make competition difficult
– Specify members of Canadian networks
– Previous limits on size of US banks
• US anti-trust law worsens outcomes
• Cheques and the Federal Reserve
– Lesson relevant to NZ
Conclusions
• Restrictions often harm users
– Bad for innovation
• NZ a stand-out because has few restrictions
• Relevant to networks for cellphone payments
– NZ should simplify telco regulation
